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In this article, the author examines passage of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s (NCAA) 1.600 Rule in 1965 and the ramifications of that mandate. 
In drawing from administrative letters and memoranda available through the 
George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections and Archives, the author 
investigates Bowdoin College’s response to the 1.600 Rule, the influence of the 
College’s confrontation with the NCAA on its athletes and their ability to com-
pete at the national level, and how the conflict shaped the institution’s operations. 
Ramifications for Bowdoin College and the NCAA are discussed.
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For the first century or so of American intercollegiate athletic competition, 
most institutions maintained a separate admissions standard for athletes, choos-
ing to admit any athlete without abiding by any stated admissions policies. Since 
the inception of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in 1905 as 
the first national governing body for the enterprise, member schools have waged 
a constant struggle to come to grips with the thorny issue of academic eligibility. 
This has usually occurred through the NCAA’s legislative mechanisms, which at 
various times has pitted against each other some combinations of member institu-
tions, coaches, athletes, school presidents, politicians, and social critics. The twin 
goals of this process have been to determine (a) what exactly the appropriate level 
of academic achievement should be required of prospective student-athletes, and 
(b) how these factors should be assessed first in the admissions process, and then 
again as student-athletes pursued their studies once enrolled. 
These are the dual factors that would eventually become known as initial 
(preenrollment) and continuing (postenrollment) eligibility. 
The NCAA assumed gradually and piecemeal the role of arbiter for initial 
eligibility academic requirements, but the standardization that occurred as the 
NCAA attempted to level this playing field runs counter to trends in American 
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higher education. As John Thelin observed, higher education “is remarkable for 
its decentralized arrangement characterized by institutional autonomy, voluntary 
association, and relatively little government regulation” (1996, p. 10). In addition, 
the legitimization of intercollegiate athletics is made through eligibility rules, 
which as noted by Helman, provide “standards that tether commercial athletics to 
the educational purposes of a higher education” (1989, p. 237). The constant fric-
tion over what constitutes acceptable benchmarks by which student-athletes are to 
be deemed eligible has led to an evolving set of evaluative criteria, with a varying 
corresponding degree of effectiveness in assuring that those who participate in 
athletics are not merely athletes, but also truly students. 
In the mid-1960s, conflict over academic eligibility issues emerged to the 
most significant level in NCAA history with the passage of the 1.600 Rule, which 
prescribed the eligibility of student-athletes at NCAA member institutions to an 
unprecedented degree. The rule established that a prospective student-athlete must 
attain specific marks in grade-point average and standardized test scores to be eli-
gible to compete and to receive athletically related financial aid. While some member 
institutions bristled at the passage of this mandate, only a handful, most notably 
Bowdoin College, chose to denounce the rule publicly and refused to submit to the 
directive. This action meant that Bowdoin student-athletes would not be eligible 
to participate in NCAA championship events, which meant that standout Bowdoin 
hammer thrower, Alex Schulten, would be barred from a very real chance to win 
the event at the 1966 indoor track and field championships. 
This research, based on administrative letters and memoranda available through 
the George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections and Archives at Bowdoin 
College, as well as newspaper reports and other publications from the period, will 
reconstruct the events that led to this decision by Bowdoin, examines how Bowdoin 
administrators attempted to manage the implications of their decisions regarding 
the 1.600 rule, and how the issue was ultimately resolved. While Bowdoin officials 
claimed institutional autonomy as the reason for their actions, this research shows 
that issues relating to athletically related financial aid, something the school claimed 
it did not offer, was a key factor in driving college officials to oppose 1.600. This 
research also seeks to put into context how the NCAA was establishing greater 
influence on the mission, goals and operational areas of its member institutions, 
the immediate impact of this shift, and the implications of these influences today.
The 1.600 Rule
As noted previously, there are two components to the determination of academic 
eligibility for student-athletes: initial (preenrollment) and continuing (postenroll-
ment). Initial eligibility refers to the determination of the appropriate level of 
academic achievement for incoming prospects. The demise of the Sanity Code in 
the late 1940s in part led to the establishment of formal athletic scholarships. To 
this point, Sack and Staurowsky state that “with an athletic scholarship system 
in place, it became absolutely imperative for the NCAA to establish a minimum 
academic level for awarding scholarships. To not do so would have fueled public 
cynicism that already surrounded professionalized college sports” (1998, p. 96). 
The bulk of NCAA legislation over the next decade dealt with recruiting and 
athletic aid issues, and it was left again to conferences to create and enforce aca-
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demic standards, although in 1959 the NCAA did strengthen academic eligibility 
standards for their championship competitions, requiring that student-athletes be 
enrolled in a full course of study of no fewer than 12 semester or quarter hours 
(Falla, 1981). 
Also in 1959, an initial call for the NCAA to adopt an association-wide initial 
eligibility academic requirement came forth from Stanford University’s Rixford 
Snyder (the school’s director of admissions and Faculty Athletics Representative to 
the Pacific Coast Conference). According to Smith (2011), Snyder told delegates at 
the ’59 NCAA Convention that the best predictors for academic success in college 
were high school grades and scores on standardized tests, and when the two were 
weighed together, the prediction on college success was greater still. In 1962, the 
NCAA established a committee, lead by Atlantic Coast Conference commissioner 
James Weaver, to determine a formula for “predicting academic success” for those 
student-athletes who received athletic aid (Smith, 2011, p. 128). 
As a result, the NCAA membership approved a national standard in 1965, set 
to take effect on January 1, 1966, that required an incoming athlete to achieve a 
predicted first-year college GPA of at least 1.600 (on a 4.0 scale) before the prospect 
could receive athletically related aid, based on a computation of a prospect’s class 
rank and standardized test score on either the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or the 
test administered by American College Testing (ACT). The so-called “1.600 Rule” 
was the association’s first-ever minimum academic standard for the awarding of 
athletically related financial aid. The prospect’s standardized test scores were also 
used in determining eligibility, which according to former NCAA Executive Direc-
tor Walter Byers (who held that position at the time 1.600 was passed), “provided 
an essential national comparative standard” (1995, p. 158). 
The Form of Opposition: Bowdoin College
That opposition to the 1.600 Rule was voiced is not surprising, for, much like with 
the avowals of noncompliance expressed in response to the Sanity Code, many 
schools saw the rule as a threat to their competitiveness. But criticism and out-
right defiance came from unexpected sources as well, namely the members of the 
Ivy League and some other so-called “selective” schools. These schools—which 
enjoyed public recognition and prestige as the perceived leading academic institu-
tions in the United States—stated that they were unwilling to submit to NCAA 
control over their admissions processes and academic autonomy, and chose to 
denounce the measure publicly. But one school would become more active and more 
public than any other in fighting 1.600: Bowdoin College. A private, all-male col-
lege founded at the close of the eighteenth century in Brunswick, Maine, Bowdoin 
had evolved into a small (fewer than a thousand students), four-year, academically 
selective liberal arts institution still all male. 
When 1.600 passed and became effective as Article 4, Section 6-(b) of the 
NCAA’s Bylaws, Bowdoin College issued a press release stating that the school 
“will continue determine its admissions policies and financial aid programs to 
best serve the interests of Bowdoin students, and thus cannot comply with the new 
rule” (“Bowdoin College,” 1966, p. 1). The press release stated further that in a 
letter to NCAA President Everett D. (“Eppy”) Barnes, Bowdoin President James 
S. Coles wrote:
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Bowdoin College does not differentiate between ‘student-athletes’ and other 
students and consequently believes that the (required certification) form 
involved has no application to us. All our students are admitted by our own 
policies and procedures and the awards of scholarship aid are determined by 
us on the basis of need and performance. We have no intention of altering this 
procedure (“Bowdoin College,” 1966, p. 2).
Also cited in the press release, Bowdoin athletic director Malcolm E. (“Mal”) 
Morrell, who no doubt was well aware of the impending applications of the rule and 
its potential impacts, said of 1.600: “It seems unbelievable that the NCAA Council 
would promote legislation that could cause many of its high standard institutions to 
give up memberships they have held for years” (“Bowdoin College,” 1966, p. 2). 
The press release then stated that based on the action, Bowdoin would be barred 
from sending athletes to NCAA-sanctioned track and swimming championships 
(the College, under an agreement with several other similar New England colleges, 
did not permit any team sports to participate in NCAA postseason events). Thus, 
Bowdoin’s Alex Schulten would be unable to participate in the hammer-throw in 
the upcoming NCAA indoor track and field championships, an event he had won 
at the outdoor championships in 1964 (“Bowdoin College,” 1966). Schulten was 
seeded Number 1 in the Association’s indoor meet scheduled for Detroit in mid-
March (Litsky, 1966; “N.C.A.A. championships,” 1966). Of the implications of 
the College’s decision, the Bowdoin Alumnus, the College-published magazine for 
alumni, wrote: “If the road to hell is indeed paved with good intentions, the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association holds the construction contract … Most directly 
affected by the ban will be Alex Schulten ’66” (“Revolt,” 1966, p. 5). 
Alex Schulten: The Direct Victim 
of Bowdoin’s Actions
As a sophomore in 1964, Frederick Alexis “Alex” Schulten won the NCAA Cham-
pionship in the outdoor hammer throw with a toss of 191 feet, 6 inches, and earned 
AAU All-American recognition in both the collegiate and university divisions. 
Later that summer, Schulten was a finalist at the United States Olympic Trials, 
just missing out on an Olympic berth for the 1964 Tokyo Summer Games. As a 
junior, Schulten continued to excel, going undefeated in the 35-pound weight throw 
and capturing the Indoor College Championship. Again he was undefeated in the 
hammer throw outdoors, earning AAU All-American honors and notching the top 
collegiate throw of the year with a school record 202 feet, 11 inches—a mark that 
still stands. When he graduated, Schulten held every school record in the hammer 
throw and 35-pound indoor weight throw (Calhoun, 1993; “F. Alexis,” 2009).
While Schulten was clearly a world-class athlete, there was early evidence that 
Bowdoin officials were less than enthused with promoting and supporting his efforts. 
The College opted not to aid Schulten with his expenses and travel for the several 
collegiate championship meets and the 1964 Olympic Trials, a decision which was 
met with derision, as demonstrated in an op-ed piece in the Bowdoin Orient, the 
campus student newspaper (Pappas & Graham, 1964). Nonetheless, the College 
was still keen to garner some measure of connectedness with Schulten’s success. 
Schulten was pictured on cover of March 1965 Bowdoin Alumnus having just com-
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pleted a throw in a meet against Boston University. The campus newspaper kept 
informing its readers of Schulten’s continuing development in 1965, and continued 
to lobby for support for Schulten to travel to significant meets (Blankman, 1965). 
The question of why administrators at the College demonstrated ambivalence 
toward the achievements of Schulten could be addressed by examining the back-
ground of Bowdoin’s president, James Stacey (“Spike”) Coles. Coles was not an 
alumnus of Bowdoin—unlike his predecessor, the long-serving Kenneth C. M. 
Sills, who presided at the helm of the College from 1917 to 1952. Athletics, by 
Coles’ own admission, was not an area of expertise for the president, for as late as 
1966, Coles would describe himself to Williams College president John Sawyer 
as “a babe in the woods with respect to athletics” (Coles, 1966c, p. 1). He had, 
though, served as Brown University’s representative to the Ivy League Eligibil-
ity Committee while serving as Acting Dean there. That notwithstanding, Coles 
was under no illusion as to the role of managing athletics issues, as evidenced in 
a letter written to Coles early in his presidency by Bowdoin’s venerable athletic 
director Mal Morrell:
You told me yesterday, and I am sure that it is true, that the athletic problem 
causes the President more trouble than all of the other departments of the Col-
lege. I suppose one reason that this is true is because in this field of experience 
the College is in open competition and the results are known to the public 
(Morrell, 1955, p. 2). 
On the surface, it may have appeared that in 1966 Bowdoin’s institutional 
approach to athletics remained as it had been in 1952 when Coles took office, but 
there were issues at play in the specific Bowdoin and general national intercollegiate 
athletics environments during Coles’ presidency—public scrutiny being just one 
of the factors—that tested his and the College’s ability to manage athletics issues 
effectively. The 1.600 Rule and its impact on Schulten and other operational areas 
of athletic management—occurring just a year before Coles’ leaving the post of 
president—would prove to be a significant challenge.
Opposition to 1.600 Solidifies: Bowdoin’s 
Administrative Responses
In early February 1966, a week after the College issued the noncompliance press 
release, Coles wrote a confidential memo to AD Morrell noting that the presidents 
of Bowdoin’s Pentagonal Agreement peer schools (Amherst, Wesleyan University 
and Williams College; the grouping originally included a fifth school—Dartmouth 
College) would be discussing 1.600 at a meeting later that month. The grouping 
was not a formal league but affiliated based on a common agreement concerning 
athletic policies. Coles stated to Morrell that Amherst “has not gone along with 
this rule,” and that Wesleyan “is now in the process of reviewing its position on the 
rule” (Coles, 1966a, p. 1). Coles proceeded to deconstruct and to criticize the rule 
in the memo to Morrell, stating the rule meant that “if a student-athlete fails to meet 
the 1.600 requirement, aid must be withdrawn until the student attains the required 
grade point average. So far as I can see, this is a rule drawn more for the advantage 
of the institution than for the student-athlete” (Coles, 1966a, p. 1, emphasis added). 
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Based on his conceptual misgivings about the fairness of 1.600, Coles pro-
ceeded to parse out a way to avoid its application. Citing a memo from the NCAA’s 
Barnes dated October 8, 1965, which spelled out that the rule was “applicable to 
student-athletes first entering member institutions January 1, 1966 and thereafter,” 
Coles noted that current Bowdoin students would not be affected by this rule. “We 
could well claim,” he wrote Morrell, “that since this is the case, such men should 
be permitted to compete, even though the institution has not indicated its intention 
to enforce such rule for men who enter the College after January 1, 1966” (Coles, 
1966a, p. 1). 
Coles ended the memo with the threat: 
Should the NCAA not change its position, it might be very much worthwhile 
for the Pentagonal Colleges, along with the Ivy League Colleges, to consider 
withdrawing from the NCAA, to form their own association with their own 
championships in individual sports to be run concurrently with the NCAA 
championships (Coles, 1966a, p. 1). 
The terms used and intent of this last phrase are particularly illustrative. Coles 
is quite specific and intentional in using the term “individual sports,” since the 
Pentagonal Agreement did not permit team sports to participate in NCAA champi-
onships. This restriction would continue to cause friction on the Bowdoin campus 
for subsequent decades. In addition, such an arrangement would continue to allow 
the rare athlete like Schulten to shine on a more national stage, as well as open up 
slots for more Bowdoin athletes, since a championship event drawing from fewer 
schools would likely lead to more available slots for competitors from Bowdoin. 
The alternative model proposed by Coles, with his Ivy League background (having 
attended Columbia University and taught and served as an administrator at Brown 
before taking the helm at Bowdoin), also expresses the effort of Bowdoin and other 
peer schools in seeking to augment institutional prestige through a closer affiliation 
with the elite Ivies. The question unanswered in Coles’ scheme is what benefits 
would the Ivies gain through turning away from NCAAs to align with Bowdoin 
and the Pentagonals. Such a move would likely be viewed as athletic diminution 
on the part of the Ivies by most observers, with potentially damaging impacts to 
competitiveness and spectator interest.
To garner support for his position, Coles sent copies of the College’s noncom-
pliance press release to presidential colleagues around the Northeast. In response, 
Bucknell University President Charles Watts noted that “we are contemplating 
similar action … I see that Colgate (University) has agreed to it, which surprises 
me a little bit, as has Lehigh (University). I will let you know what we decide to 
do” (Watts, 1966, p. 1). Colgate’s president, Vincent Barnett, Jr., wrote Coles and 
noted that “Williams, Wesleyan and Trinity (College in Connecticut) have indicated 
their adherence to the rule. It seems to me there is room for some difference of 
opinion here, and I hope the matter can be ironed out in some way that avoids an 
open split” (Barnett, 1966, p. 1). 
But a spilt seemed to be in the offing, and the NCAA was looking to head it 
off by giving Bowdoin and 56 other member schools (including the Ivies, Amherst 
College, Middlebury College, Hamilton College, and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) a one-week extension to February 22 to prove compliance with 1.600 
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(Middlebury would also later, like Bowdoin, refuse to comply). Wiles Hallock of 
the NCAA noted that the extensions were granted “because (the schools) have had 
correspondences with the NCAA office on the problem and in some cases it is a 
matter of technical difficulties” (White, 1966, p. 14). But the Ivy League insisted 
it would not fill out the required forms for compliance and was also threatening 
to resign over the issue (White, 1966). Two days after that, the Ivies indicated 
compliance (although the schools never filled out the proper forms), probably to 
preserve the league’s slot in the NCAA’s men’s basketball tournament (“Ivy League 
to accept,” 1966). 
But a week later, the University of Pennsylvania and Yale University were 
deemed ineligible nonetheless for NCAA postseason events because the schools 
refused to comply (“Ivy League drops,” 1966). The actions of the Ivies would seem 
to have bolstered Bowdoin’s position on 1.600, as some would have viewed Bowdoin 
favorably if the institution were perceived to be acting like the Ivies. Pentagonal 
partner Williams College was also not complying, furthering Bowdoin’s stance.
In late February 1966, NCAA President Barnes wrote to Sports Illustrated in a 
response to an article in which the magazine wrote critically of 1.600. Barnes stated: 
The legislation simply states that if a college intends to compete with its sister 
institutions for national championship honors, it should require a minimum 1.6 
average of students who are receiving financial assistance based in any part 
on athletic ability before they may engage in intercollegiate activity (Barnes, 
1966, p. 75). 
Coles responded to Barnes soon thereafter that “scholarships (at Bowdoin) are 
granted only on the basis of (students’) academic promise … (and) are granted only 
on the basis of determined financial need and academic ability.” Coles went on to 
state, “No distinction is made with respect to participation or non-participation in 
intercollegiate athletics…. We recognize that the policies outlined above would be 
in conformity with the standards of academic progress and performance expected by 
the NCAA of men participating in intercollegiate athletics.” Accordingly, reasoned 
Coles, Bowdoin College students should be able participate in NCAA sponsored 
championships (Coles, 1966b, pp. 1–2).
The nature of Coles’ response would seem to have put the issue to rest. In 
his response to Barnes, Coles was stating flatly that Bowdoin gave no athletic aid; 
therefore, compliance with 1.600 should have been a simple matter. But Bowdoin’s 
stated approach to athletic aid versus the school’s actual practices would prove to 
be unaligned.
Schulten’s NCAA Fate
While campus sources and College administrators provided a wealth of comments 
on the 1.600 issue, the mainstream local press did not. The Press Herald, published 
in Portland, located 25 miles south of Brunswick in Maine’s largest city, did run 
three UPI wires stories on the 1.600 issue as it impacted Pennsylvania and the Ivies 
(February 25, 26 and March 5). On March 10, the paper ran one of a very few men-
tions of 1.600 as it impacted Bowdoin, citing comments from a Bowdoin admin-
istrator made at an end-of-season banquet. It stated that Nathaniel C. Kendrick, 
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dean of the College, had told a gathering of Bowdoin athletes at the winter sports 
awards dinner that College “could not justifiably turn over to the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association its authority to rule on admission, eligibility, or scholarship 
awards to students. Dean Kendrick predicted, ‘I don’t think this controversy is 
finished by a long shot.’” The Press Herald also cited that Kendrick admitted that 
Schulten would be among those banned. “Alex Schulten never got a scholarship 
from Bowdoin,” Kendrick added at the gathering (“Dean reaffirms,” 1966, p. 22).
What is interesting to note from these comments is whether Kendrick was 
making general remarks, or was responding to comments from the audience or from 
a reporter. It is also equally intriguing to note that Kendrick made specific refer-
ence to Schulten in offering a denial that he received a “scholarship.” Aside from 
the fact that may have been offering personal information pertaining to Schulten’s 
financial status, it would seem to indicate that the concept of athletic aid was the 
crux of the fight from compliance with 1.600. 
Meanwhile, as Schulten’s NCAA fate was being sealed, other voices on campus 
were falling in line with the administrative stance. In March, the student newspaper 
(which may or may not have had full editorial control, since the College’s dean of 
the students and future acting college president, Athern P. Daggett, was a member 
of the paper’s publishing board, along with members of the Orient staff of under-
graduates), reported on the progress of the issue, noting that Bowdoin was in step 
with Williams and the Ivies. The paper cited William Morgan, AD Mal Morrell’s 
assistant, who commented that the College would “resolve its differences with the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association following whatever pattern is worked 
out with by the Ivy League” (Rice, 1966b, p. 4). The paper also noted that four 
other schools (including Williams) had specifically announced that they would not 
comply. “The appearance of Williams on this list is significant,” wrote the paper. 
“Williams has chosen to definitely buck the NCAA pressure … As Mr. Morgan 
said, ‘I think they (the NCAA) bit off more than they could chew.’ This, we think, 
is entirely possible” (Rice, 1966a, p. 4). 
On the same date as Kendrick’s awards dinner comments, the Orient published 
an additional commentary on 1.600, again expressing its perception that Bowdoin 
and Ivies could bring the NCAA to heel. The writer again missed the athletic aid 
point while offering a prediction that the issue might bring an end to the NCAA’s 
governing powers. The paper continued that Bowdoin’s position in this dispute 
will in essence be that of the Ivy League, and noted that Dean Kendrick “feels 
that the NCAA will have to back down.” The consequence of the “stalemate,” 
stated Kendrick, was that Alex Schulten would not be entered in the upcoming 
NCAA championships. Wrote the paper: “We again must express our support for 
the College’s position … The NCAA certainly seems, as was noted last week, to 
have bitten off more than it could chew” (Rice, 1966b, p. 4). The Orient offered 
a final comment on 1.600 in a brief reference (with no mention of Schulten) in an 
editorial in its end-of-year issue: “The College’s stand on the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association ruling requiring a grade point average of at least 1.6 in awarding 
scholarships to ‘student-athletes’ was commendable, and indicates the College’s 
concern for its students” (“Editorial,” 1966, p. 4). No further comments would be 
made, and no additional clarification offered as to how the College’s stance in any 
way was forwarding a sense of concern for its charges, especially since the refusal 
to comply came at the expense of Schulten’s NCAA title hopes. 
Bowdoin College  249
In addition to the documented perspectives published in the student newspaper, 
the administrative files available in the archives at Bowdoin contain feedback from 
other stakeholder groups. In June 1966, track coach Frank Sabasteanski forwarded 
to President Coles a letter Sabasteanski received from a former Bowdoin student 
track manager, James H. Bradner, Jr., who was attending law school at Ohio State 
University. The letter Bradner sent was supportive of the College’s stand against 
1.600, noting that because of the dispute “perhaps it is inevitable that the scholas-
tically oriented smaller colleges will have to withdraw from the NCAA and form 
their own athletic association.” In also noting that “the average undergraduate at 
a Big Ten university is just not of the high intellectual caliber of the Bowdoin 
undergraduate,” Brander concluded:
I hope Bowdoin will stick firmly to its present policy regarding the NCAA 1.6 
rule … I wanted the Athletic Department to know that at least one individual 
enthusiastically supports their conception of athletics and its place in the col-
legiate atmosphere (Bradner, 1966, p. 1-2). 
While Bradner’s passion is clearly expressed, it is also intriguing to the degree 
that it lobbies for Bowdoin to separate from schools like Ohio State and form a 
new type of association. While this suggestion, as others like it, would never come 
to pass, it does presage by several years the movement within the NCAA to create 
the current three division classification system, which, by establishing specific 
missions and visions for each of the three tiers, would help keep a growing and 
increasingly disparate association from splintering.
However, other alumni were less than enthused with the College’s tack on the 
issue, as evidenced by the letter published in the Alumnus from Joseph F. Tiede 
(Class of 1952) from Raleigh, North Carolina. In correctly observing that “The 
great majority of NCAA-member schools approved the ruling,” Tiede opines: 
It seems to me that Bowdoin and the other protesting colleges are skirting 
the issue and thereby punishing their own athletes for no compelling reason. 
Anyone can see the rule was not aimed at the academic giants, but at schools 
with questionable standards for athletes (Tiede, 1996, p. 1) 
Tiede ends his letter with the question:
Is Bowdoin in the habit of admitting athletes, or any students, who cannot meet 
the minimum NCAA requirements? That is doubtful. Then why should it object 
to an effort that would raise the standards that need raising? … This attitude, 
in my opinion, is selfish, short-sighted, and sanctimonious (Tiede, 1966, p.1). 
Tiede’s letter raises several compelling points, especially in its ability to capture 
a sense of confusion as to why Bowdoin would choose to fight 1.600 and deny 
athletes like Schulten a chance at athletic success for what he calls “no compelling 
reason.” Like the letter from former track manager and fellow alumnus Bradner, 
Tiede agrees that an institution like Bowdoin with its academic and athletic direc-
tions should not be impeded with the dictates of 1.600. But the actions that Tiede 
interprets as “selfish, short-sighted, and sanctimonious” would turn out to be focused 
on covering practices that were more problematic.
250  Covell
Bowdoin’s Post-Schulten Administrative Responses
In June 1966, after Alex Schulten graduated having missed out on his opportunity 
to compete at the NCAA championships, Bowdoin’s Kendrick responded to an 
NCAA survey seeking information about potential revisions to 1.600. Kendrick 
asked the Association to allow institutions “which base financial aid on need and 
performance but not on athletic qualifications, performance, and participation,” to 
be free to formulate their own admissions policies and standards and to determine 
their own rules of eligibility:
For college teams as long as these men are regular students in the college … 
From our point of view repeal would be better but revision to take care of 
colleges which do not have ‘student athletes’ and athletic scholarships would 
probably be acceptable (Kendrick, 1966, pp. 1-2). 
Kendrick—and now it would seem to be some sort of intentional obtuseness—
again seems to miss the point about the focus of 1.600 pertaining to those student-
athletes who received athletic aid. The 1.600 legislation never restricted a school in 
its admissions policies and standards, nor did it restrict athlete eligibility. It merely 
limited athletic aid to those student-athletes who had achieved the predicted 1.600.
In January 1967, Bowdoin’s Faculty Committee on Athletics, composed of 
faculty members and with limited influence and control over athletic policy, held 
fast to this misguided stance. The committee reported that it had reviewed and 
approved the position that College “cannot subscribe” to the rule. “The rule does 
not distinguish between athletic scholarships and general scholarships for which 
athletics are viewed as simply an extracurricular activity,” read the statement. “The 
desirability of our own scholarship policy being determined by the College in terms 
of its own objectives seems obvious (“Report,” 1967, p. 1). 
The wording in this statement supports the notion that Bowdoin did indeed 
provide aid to students based on athletic ability, regardless of whether it was per-
ceived as something merely to be pursued as an “extracurricular activity.” Such 
a distinction may have meant something to this group, but in terms of NCAA 
compliance, it was a specious distinction.
The NCAA Offers a Loophole
A year after the initial conflict over 1.600, the Ivies and the NCAA settled their 
issues in February of 1967 (just before that year’s NCAA men’s basketball tourna-
ment) after “personal conversations” between Yale president Kingman Brewster and 
NCAA President Marcus Plant, which “emphasized how the Ivy Group admissions 
policies are such that they do not admit any students, athletes or not, who would 
fall below the 1.600 prediction” (“An interim agreement,” 1967, p. 1). Following 
this, it was Coles rather than Kendrick who wrote Plant seeking “a copy of the 
agreement which the NCAA has reached with the institutions in the Ivy Group. 
Would this same agreement be available to Bowdoin College … should we find it 
not inconsistent with basic institutional policy?”(Coles, 1967b, p. 1) Plant wrote 
back that Bowdoin needed to submit a statement that the College “does not accept 
any student, athlete or not, who would fall below the 1.600 prediction,” and confirm 
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that sophomores must earn a grade point average of at least 1.6 on a 4.0 scale to 
be eligible for intercollegiate athletic practice or competition “or if he is to receive 
financial aid in which athletic ability is considered in any degree in making the 
award” (Plant, 1967a, p. 1). 
A key distinction offered by Plant was that between the initial and continuing 
eligibility components of 1.600, where a school had to certify that no students 
would be accepted nor allowed to compete if they did not meet the prediction 
threshold, and the issue of athletically related aid. Plant’s response differs from 
the clarification offered by NCAA President Barnes to Sports Illustrated after the 
measure went into effect. This new interpretation, therefore, allowed first the Ivies 
then Bowdoin to skirt the issue of athletic aid and certify instead that they neither 
admitted nor allowed to compete any student-athlete who fell below the 1.600 
threshold. And since Bowdoin and the Ivies had made such a public stance of their 
academic selectivity, it would seem that the NCAA established this loophole for 
them to step through.
“Thank you for your thoughtful and clear letter of 1 March 1967,” Coles 
replied two days later (after feedback in a memo from AD Morrell). He continued:
Had this procedure been set forth last year, it would have solved the problem 
of participation in the Hammer Throwing Championship … Had Alex Schul-
ten not graduated last June, it would permit him to participate this year. But 
small colleges like Bowdoin have few athletes of championship caliber (Coles, 
1967c, pp. 1-2).
Coles continued that for future possible participation in NCAA champion-
ships, Bowdoin would submit a statement under Point 1 of the alternate procedure 
outlined in Plant’s letter that Bowdoin does not accept any student, “athlete or not,” 
who would fall below the 1.600 prediction on the NCAA national table (Coles, 
1967c, pp. 1–2). 
But Coles still did not fully embrace the waiver Plant offered, stating that in 
respect to Point 2, the College would not confirm that a continuing student must 
earn a grade point average of at least 1.600 to be eligible for intercollegiate athletic 
practice or competition. Coles explained that this approach “determined on what 
we believe to be sound educational grounds, that any student registered in college is 
eligible for intercollegiate practice or competition, provided only that students who 
are on academic probation will be required to meet all academic appointments.” 
This policy permitted participation in practice and home games, but prohibited 
participation in games away from home, if absence from classes is involved. “On 
the basis of experience at Bowdoin,” Coles continued, “and in my own experience 
as a Dean before coming to Bowdoin, it seems clear that an active vigorous young 
man, long accustomed to intensive athletic activity, will study better and work 
better if that activity can be continued, than is the case when he is prohibited from 
all such activity.” In closing, Coles hoped that “it may be possible for the NCAA 
to resolve this problem in such a fashion that all of its member institutions may 
have full and equal participation in all NCAA-sponsored championships” (Coles, 
1967c, pp. 1–2). 
Coles was still holding out against the NCAA’s membership-approved inter-
pretations of 1.600 in stating that the College would allow any student-athlete to 
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compete regardless of his GPA. He was, however, being disingenuous in claiming 
that he hoped “that all of its member institutions may have full and equal participa-
tion in all NCAA-sponsored championships,” since Bowdoin, as part of the Pen-
tagonal Agreement with Amherst, Wesleyan and Williams, did not permit any team 
sport to participate in any postseason competitions whatsoever, including NCAA 
championships. The signatory schools had formally approved this postseason team 
sport ban in 1961, with a substantial amount of debate concerning the ban occur-
ring up to that point, much of it in the form of complaints from students, coaches, 
and athletic directors. 
The team ban rule was never embraced by the athletic rank and file at member 
schools, as evidence by a June 1964 meeting of the four Pentagonal ADs at Bow-
doin. The ADs reported that all coaches of each of the four schools wanted the 
rule reviewed and changed, as did two of the ADs (Morrell of Bowdoin and E.E. 
Richardson of Amherst) (Thoms, 1964). 
In response to these grumblings, in early ’67 (at the same time he was playing 
things out with Marcus Plant and the NCAA) Coles wrote the other Pentagonal 
presidents with the following: “We still have complaints from our coaches and 
undergraduates with respect to post-season championships. One might wonder 
whether or not the pain this causes is worth the possible gains from this particular 
rule” (Coles, 1967a, p. 1). Williams president Sawyer, who had also chosen not to 
comply with 1.600 certification, responded to Coles in favor of postseason play, 
noting that it “has a great deal in its favor as a general policy of agreement … in 
contrast to the build-up of pressures that comes on any one institution at the time 
a winning team builds up steam for a post-season trip” (Sawyer, 1967, p. 1). 
While the 1.600 Rule was in theory a separate issue from that of postseason 
competition, the banning of Schulten because of it did add fuel to the fire sur-
rounding the team sport ban. Initially, some of the flak was related to the perceived 
double-standard that individual sport athletes could compete in postseason contests, 
while team sport athletes could not. While the issue would not have been of much 
significance previously, the fact that the Association was beginning to hold “Col-
lege Division” championships meant that Bowdoin teams now had a more realistic 
shot at postseason qualification. The issue would become more problematic with 
the creation of the formal Division III classification in 1973, and would continue 
to cause trouble for Bowdoin and its eventual New England Small College Athletic 
Conference (NESCAC) members. The issue simmered until the team sport ban 
was lifted in 1994, and again when presidents sought to reinstate a limitation on 
appearances a few years later. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to consider that Coles 
and his presidential colleagues may have been using the 1.600 Rule dispute as a 
way to bring individual sports under the same prohibition as team sports, while 
conveniently foisting the blame for it on the NCAA.
Athletically Related Aid at Bowdoin: 
A Key Factor in the 1.600 Fight
It is significant to note that Bowdoin officials failed consistently to mark the refer-
ences to the athletic aid issue outlined by the NCAA’s Everett Barnes in his Sports 
Illustrated letter, and later reinforced by the NCAA’s Marcus Plant in March of 
1967. In his Sports Illustrated letter, Barnes stated clearly that the rule requires “a 
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minimum 1.6 average of students who are receiving financial assistance based in 
any part on athletic ability” (Barnes, 1966, p. 1). A year later, Plant specifically 
reinforced this concept in a letter to Coles (Plant, 1967a). It seems like much of 
the wrangling could have been avoided if Bowdoin, the Pentagonals, and the Ivies 
if officials at these schools had read the rule’s aid component closely and certified 
that no such aid awards were being issued. 
However, comments of Bowdoin’s Faculty Committee on Athletics made 
in early 1967 supports the notion that athletic ability was indeed a factor in 
determining some aid awards. This issue is highlighted in part by a letter from 
Yale President Brewster to President Sawyer of Williams written in September 
1967. Brewster noted that he and the NCAA’s Marcus Plant had been engaged in 
“informal conversations and correspondence” to see whether the NCAA and the 
Ivy League could resolve their remaining differences with respect to 1.600, but 
that any resolution seemed impossible “especially with respect to (the section) of 
that legislation covering financial aid and athletic eligibility for students already 
enrolled” (Brewster, 1967, p. 1).
This would show to be an issue at Bowdoin as well, as evidenced by the cre-
ation and maintenance of the Arthur D. and Francis J. Welch Scholarship Fund, 
established in 1966. The Welch Scholarship, as it would become known, was given 
by Mr. And Mrs. Edward P. Morgan, Vincent B. Welch (Bowdoin Class of 1938), 
and his wife, to honor Arthur D. Welch (Vincent’s father) and Francis J. (Vincent’s 
uncle)—both of whom were also Bowdoin graduates. It was anticipated that the 
fund would provide a $1200 grant beginning in 1967, with one new $1200 added 
each year until further notice. The fund was endowed with $54,000 in 1967, and 
funded through the deed of 42 oceanfront lots in Ocean Beach, Maryland. The 
qualifications of the Welch Scholarship were first listed in the 1967–1968 Bow-
doin College Bulletin, a College publication that served notice of courses offered, 
admissions policies, as well as other pertinent College information, noting the 
restriction: “Preference to students athletically adept and from outside New Eng-
land” (Bowdoin College Bulletin, 1967, p. 75). This was not the only scholarship 
intended for student-athletes, as the 1967 Bulletin lists one other grant with restric-
tions that awards be given to the athletically adept: The Class of 1940 Memorial 
Scholarship, established in 1965, based on a fund totaling over $15,000 (Bowdoin 
College Bulletin, 1967). 
At the time the Welch Scholarship fund was established, Coles sent a memo-
randum to Director of Admissions Richard Moll and Director of Student Aid Walter 
Moulton outlining Vincent Welch’s perspective on the fund. This memo cited 
Welch’s belief that “too high a value cannot be placed on participation in organized 
freshman, varsity (or junior varsity) competitive squads in contact sports, track 
and field, and swimming.” Welch then put forth that those who would be awarded 
Welch Scholarships “shall be chosen from among those who are athletically adept 
and who will contribute significantly throughout a major portion of the school year 
to the College through athletic competition, as well as in other ways, to the extent 
of their ability” (Coles, 1966d, p. 1). 
Coles’ involvement with Welch and his knowledge of the circumstances on 
which the fund was created leaves no doubt that he was aware that his school was 
indeed giving athletically related aid, and that the creation of 1.600 called the 
question as to whether Bowdoin was holding true to its stated policy denouncing 
such aid. In response to this problem, the language outlining the provisions of the 
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Welch Scholarship was amended in 1968 to: “Preference to academically talented 
students of high character, with leadership potential and athletic proficiency, and 
from outside New England” (Bowdoin College Annual Catalog, 1968, p. 77). While 
it could still be argued that the Welch Scholarship was still athletically related aid, 
this charged was leavened with additional nonathletic requirements. Interestingly, 
the restrictive language for the other award targeting the athletically adept, the 
Class of 1940 Memorial Scholarship, remained unchanged.
A Compromise Is Reached
Toward the end of 1967, the NCAA’s Marcus Plant sent out a notice to all member 
schools noting proposed amendments to 1.600 to be voted on at the Association’s 
1968 Annual Meeting that January in New York City (Plant, 1967b). The amend-
ment stated that the continuing eligibility portion of 1.600 would not apply to 
institutions that used the NCAA’s national experience tables “or more demanding 
institutional or conference predictive formulae in (the initial admissions process).” 
Plant concluded that “such institutions shall be limited only by the official insti-
tutional regulations governing normal progress toward a degree for all students as 
well as any other applicable institutional eligibility rules” (“N.C.A.A. Council-
sponsored,” 1967, p. 1). 
While Bowdoin’s administrators had been pushing the NCAA for such excep-
tions, based on the proposed amendments it was clear that Bowdoin was not alone. 
The NCAA would be sued several times in conjunction with efforts to overturn 
1.600, although unsuccessfully. The result of the passage of the measure, however, 
was that the academic caliber of student-athletes improved considerably nationally. 
Nonetheless, attempts to weaken 1.600 were defeated at almost every convention 
until 1973 (“New ‘triple option,’” 1978).
After the Association’s meeting where 1.600 was eliminated, new Bowdoin 
AD Daniel Stuckey reported to Athern Daggett, the former Dean now serving as 
Bowdoin’s acting president: “Bowdoin can set its own policy in regard to financial 
aid and athletic eligibility, since its prediction tables are more demanding than the 
national tables” (Stuckey, 1968, p. 1). Dean of the College (and future Bowdoin 
president), A. LeRoy Greason Jr., was now responsible for matters pertaining to 
1.600, and duly supplied the NCAA the College’s predictive formula for first-year 
students via telegram on March 7, 1968. Greason reported that students were 
admitted to the college on the basis of five factors: performance in college board 
tests (the SAT and three achievement tests), school records and statement, letters 
of reference, personal characteristics, and (usually) interviews. “The emphasis may 
vary as the Faculty Committee passes on each case, but no student is admitted for 
whom passing work is not expected,” Greason stated (“Institutional predictive,” 
1968, p. 1). 
In terms of continuing eligibility, the formula outlined noted Bowdoin’s unique 
grading system—High Honors, Honors, Pass, Fail—rather than the traditional 
“A, B, C, D, F” letter system. In this system, “Pass” was defined as “satisfactory 
performance consistent with standards for graduation.” Greason explained further 
that “grades are not averaged, because they have no numerical equivalents, but a 
student who receives a failing grade is usually ineligible for scholarship assistance.” 
Greason further stated that “Without numerical equivalents, comparison is difficult, 
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but it may be assumed that a student permitted to continue in college on scholarship 
is achieving a 1.6 minimum” (“Institutional predictive,” 1968, p. 1). 
While the amendment passed at the 1968 Convention afforded Bowdoin the 
opportunity to prove to the NCAA it was as academically selective as it claimed, 
thereby earning compliant status, initially it might have been presumed that Bow-
doin’s nontraditional grading system might have been the impediment in adhering 
to 1.600. However, there was no discussion of the grading system as an issue in any 
of the correspondences between College officials and NCAA personnel pervious to 
Greason’s 1968 communications. In addition, since this unique grading system was 
not formally adopted by Bowdoin until 1967 (Kolod, 1967), it would have no bear-
ing on the Schulten case on or the College’s initial actions against self-certification.
A week after Greason’s telegram and letter were received, Byers wrote back to 
Greason to notify him that, based on the information provided, he was “pleased to 
confirm that Bowdoin College’s policies and procedures satisfy the requirements 
of NCAA Bylaw 4-6-(b) and your institution is eligible immediately for NCAA 
events insofar as this legislation is concerned” (Byers, 1968, p. 1). Thus individual 
athletes were now free to resume championship participation. However, because 
of Bowdoin’s participation in the Pentagonal Agreement, team sport athletes were 
still relegated to the sidelines. 
Discussion and Conclusions
In his history of Bowdoin published by the College in 1993, historian Charles C. 
Calhoun noted “by the late 1960s, Bowdoin was a conservative, all-male, sports-
minded college” (p. 232). Given that description, it would seem that such a “sports-
minded” institution would revel in the fact that one of its own, Alex Schulten, could 
compete for an NCAA championship. Schulten was denied the chance to compete 
because Bowdoin’s stated stand on the 1.600 Rule issue was based on the issue of 
institutional autonomy in the face of burgeoning NCAA control. But Calhoun’s 
analysis is correct in the sense that Bowdoin was looking to bolster its athletic 
fortunes through the financial support of some recruited student-athletes via the 
awarding of athletic aid, a stance that it did not want to make public but was forced 
to address through the 1.600 certification process. 
In the end, the NCAA was forced first to amend 1.600 then to replace it with 
the much less stringent 2.00 Rule. While Bowdoin officials worked for two years 
to pitch its position of exception to the NCAA, it is unclear if these efforts directly 
influenced any Association-wide efforts to amend and eventually to replace 1.600. 
It is possible to conclude that the Ivies and Bowdoin were chipping away at 1.600 
from the stated public stance of usurped institutional autonomy, while others were 
claiming foul based on the issues of racial discrimination and impingement on 
recruiting.
At the 1973 Convention, where 1.600 was finally quashed, critics of the rule 
cited racial discrimination and loss of institutional autonomy (a claim Bowdoin 
made back in 1966) as rationale to dismantle 1.600. As a result, a new system was 
proposed, one that would merely require an athlete to have graduated from high 
school with a 2.0 or C+ average in any course of study, not necessarily one that 
focused on preparing a student to enter and to succeed in a traditional undergradu-
ate program. The membership voted to repeal 1.600 by a slim 204–187 margin 
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(Smith, 2011), and then opted to replace it with a weaker version, the “2.0 Rule.” 
The NCAA’s Walter Byers regretted the change, commenting that the loss of 
1.600 was “one of the most painful experiences” he had had while serving as the 
Association’s head. “It was a terrible day for college athletics,” when 1.600 was 
rescinded, he wrote (Byers, 1995, p. 165). The retreat from 1.600, combined with 
the declaration of freshman eligibility in 1972, led to many of the rules viola-
tions and abuses of the 1980s. Byers claimed the rule change lead to “a decade of 
mediocre academic values and free-handed recruiting” (Byers, 1995, p. 297). The 
1980s would culminate by a renewed proposal for minimum academic standards 
for prospective student-athletes. 
Of the ultimate impact of the short-lived 1.600 Rule on Bowdoin, the College 
continued to offer athletically related aid, while eventually submitting documenta-
tion that showed that all its students met the rule’s criteria. It could be argued that 
the stance to fight the NCAA taken by Coles and the College was operationally 
prudent, for through these efforts Bowdoin was able to maintain its funding of 
certain student-athletes while maintaining publicly that it did not. When 1.600 
was replaced with 2.00, the case for academic certification became all the easier. 
Even though NCAA strictures did not restrict Bowdoin from giving athletic aid, 
the College’s alliance with the three other schools in the Pentagonal Agreement 
meant that the NCAA’s expansion of oversight forced College officials to respond 
to 1.600 in one of two ways: stop the aid or stonewall. They chose the latter.
The developments relating to 1.600 also pushed the NCAA membership to 
contemplate its’ collective future. The Ivies and schools like Bowdoin had made 
pains to denounce publicly the implementation of 1.600, as the measure had forced 
the schools to confront the covert issue of athletic aid. While it is true that Bowdoin 
never changed its approach to aid, the public nature of the conflict served to push 
Bowdoin closer to an enlarged and more codified conference affiliation. 
It is also arguable that the 1.600 conflict also underscored the significant 
programmatic differences that had developed among member institutions. By the 
mid-1960s, especially in sports such as football, programs at schools like Bowdoin, 
which had emerged as short-lived powers back in the 19th century, had fallen far 
behind those fielded by the publicly supported institutions of the South, Midwest 
and West. In the years following World War II, the advent of television, the postwar 
economic expansion experienced across the country, rules changes such as open 
substitution, which allowed for even greater specialization and skill refinement 
among participants, as well as allowance of out-of-season practice sessions, led 
many programs across the country to realize the commercial opportunities and 
increased stakeholder interests associated with intercollegiate sport. While sport 
success was important to Bowdoin, the overt commercialized opportunities associ-
ated with intercollegiate athletics remained outside the school’s mission and goals.
These changes, along with the approval of institutionally awarded financial 
aid based in athletic ability, served to widen gulf between the so-called “big time” 
programs and those at schools like Bowdoin. The 1.600 Rule was the NCAA’s 
attempt at addressing the issue of initial academic eligibility through a one-size fits 
all approach. Ultimately, it can be concluded that the 1.600 issue was settled because 
even though Bowdoin wanted to sustain the operational functions that allowed it 
to be competitive among its peers, school administrators knew that leaving the 
NCAA was not a viable option. It is also clear that NCAA personnel were seeking 
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ways to help keep the Ivies, Bowdoin and others in the fold, and made substantial 
accommodations to afford compliance with the rule. 
The potential schism, combined with the environmental changes outlined 
above, would lead directly to an Association-wide restructuring through the creation 
of the three-tiered divisional classification system in 1973, which, among other 
factors, delineated the membership based on its approach to athletic aid. This seg-
mentation, however, was predated by two years by the NESCAC Agreement, which 
brought the Pentagonals together with Bowdoin’s old in-state rivals Bates College 
and Colby College, along with Hamilton, Middlebury, Trinity, Tufts University and 
Union College. Leaders at the Pentagonals had been mulling over requests from 
these and other schools for years to join their ranks, and the public disputes over 
1.600 and the move to 2.00, and the implications of these NCAA mandates over 
athletic department goals and objectives relating to areas such as athlete eligibility 
and athletic aid, no doubt contributed to drive the Pentagonals to find a larger group-
ing in which to form competitive arrangements. While this new grouping served to 
define more broadly the direction and operation of NESCAC athletic departments, 
this expanded association would also experience several identity crises, namely 
the expulsion of Union College over recruiting and aid practices pertaining to its’ 
men’s ice hockey program, and conflicts relating to team sport participation in 
NCAA championships. As a result NESCAC would become a more closely knit 
conference, eventually embracing concepts such as full round-robin scheduling 
and conference championships to name NCAA postseason participants, mirroring 
aspects that were essential components of other such groupings. 
With some variances, the concepts for initial eligibility for Division I and II 
student-athletes first established under 1.600 has been maintained under the tenets 
of Proposition 48, while Division III schools allow each individual institution to 
determine both initial and continuing eligibility. James Coles and his Bowdoin 
administrative colleagues would have no doubt approved of this ability for these 
schools to maintain this degree of institutional autonomy.
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